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1 - Introduction
In the next few decades, we will be launching expensive satellites and space
platforms that will require recovery for economic reasons, because of initial
malfunction, servicing, or repairs, or out of a concern for post lifetime
debris removal. The planned availability of a Three Point Docking
Mechanism (TPDM) is a positive step towards an operational satellite
retrieval infrastructure.
This study effort supports NASA/MSFC engineering work in developing an
automated docking capability. The work was performed by Grumman Space
& Electronics Group as part of Amendment 13 to Contract NAS8-36641,
Part 2, Concept Evaluation/Test for the Tumbling Satellite Retrieval Kit.
Simulation of a TPDM capture was performed in Grumman's Large
Amplitude Space Simulator (LASS) using mockups of both parts (the
mechanism and payload). Similar TPDM simulation activities and more
extensive hardware testing was performed at NASA/MSFC in the Flight
Robotics Laboratory and Space Station/Space Operations Mechanism Test
Bed (6-DOF Facility).
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2 - Missions for the Three Point Docking Mechanism
The TPDM provides the capability for the capture and release, on-orbit, of a
payload having latch pins (trunnions) which enables berthing of the payload
with the STS Flight Support System (FSS). The payload will be
generically called the "target vehicle" in this report; existing vehicles
(payloads) which possess latch pins (trunnions) as an integral part of their
structure are the NASA Explorer Platform spacecraft and the Hubble Space
Telescope.
The TPDM is fastened to a space vehicle having propulsion and navigation
capability. The space vehicle will be referred to as the "chase vehicle" in
this report; an example of a chase vehicle is the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle
(OMV), now canceled, and the Cargo Transfer Vehicle (CTV), now in the
planning stage. Boosters, launched from earth or those stationed on orbit
can also be configured as chase vehicles.
NASA/MSFC has modified the prior TPDM design, both in configuration
and selection of hardware elements. This study effort performs an analysis
of the present NASA/MSFC in-process configuration that also includes an
automatic rendezvous and docking (ARAD) capability using a sensor
located on the chase vehicle and alignment targets on the target vehicle.
Navigation information, based on signals generated from the sensor
illuminating the target, guide the chase vehicle towards the target vehicle at
the correct orientation for docking.
Once docked, the TPDM may have an integrated refueling probe assembly
that extends out to the target vehicle interface. Electrical interfaces are also
planned. These operations mandate that docking occur within prescribed
tolerances.
The NASA/MSFC TPDM design is based on two specific missions. These
are described in more detail in the following paragraphs.
2.1 Description of NASA/MSFC TPDM Mission Scenarios
Mission 1 - Automated Rendezvous and Capture Flight Experiment
This mission, that of capturing an free flying target, is to use a yet
undefined propulsion unit. For purpose of analysis, the propulsion unit is
to have a mass of 1000 to 3000 pounds; this unit could be a Multi-Mission
Spacecraft (MMS) type unit. The target weighs about 8000 pounds. This
mission requires the chase vehicle, with TPDM attached, to be carried into
low earth orbit in the shuttle, be placed in space by the RMS from the
shuttle cargo bay, and then, with the chase vehicle/TPDM under supervised
automated control, rendezvous with and capture the target vehicle. The
capture operation would involve use of a sensor on the chase vehicle
illuminating targets on the target platform together with chase vehicle
navigation and control algorithms to direct chase vehicle orientation and
2-1
maneuvering.Mannedsupervisionwouldbelimited to anoverridemission
abortfunctiononly, basedonscreendisplayinformation;noprovision
wouldbeavailablefor performingthemissionusingteleoperation.
Onepotentialtarget is the Explorer platform which was launched on June 7,
1992 using a Delta launch vehicle. The Explorer platform is equipped with
a GPS and docking targets, placed on the satellite before launch.
The capture demonstration mission is tentatively planned for 1996.
Missio.n 2 - Cargo Transport Vehicle Capture of the Hubble Telescope
This mission postulates use of the CTV to deliver a payload to the space
station using a strong-back cargo container and front-end propulsion assist
pod. After delivery, the CTV would jettison the strong-back and propulsion
pod into the atmosphere then perform a re-orbit maneuver to become
available for satellite retrieval missions. The jettison action would make the
TPDM available on the surface of the CTV. For purpose of analysis, the
CTV propulsion unit is to have a mass of 30,000 pounds. The target
satellite, the HST, weighs about 30,000 to 40,000 pounds. This mission
would be performed using supervised automation. The CTV, using its
guidance and navigation and radar tracking system, would rendezvous with
the HST. Final closure and capture operations would involve use of a
sensor system illuminating targets on the HST. This sensor system,
together with CTV navigation and control algorithms, will direct CTV RCS
jet firings to orient the CTV to perform the capture operation. Manned
supervision would be limited to an override mission abort function only,
based on on-line screen display information; no provision would be
available for performing the mission using teleoperation.
2.2
2.2.1
Nominal Mission Scenario Description
The following describes a nominal mission scenario that identifies the
essential step operations for using a TPDM to perform target vehicle
capture. This nominal mission discussion will be used in this study effort
to aid identification of TPDM requirements, analyze off-nominal latching
sequences, and identify issues requiring earth-based laboratory simulations.
It is assumed that the chase vehicle with the TPDM attached is placed into
position beyond the range of the TPDM docking sensor's capability to
interact with the target vehicle docking aids. If it is placed within range,
steps 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 may not apply.
Propulsion vehicle/TPDM deployment
The TPDM is assumed to be rigidly affixed to the propulsion vehicle which
provides electrical, mission command, communications and data interface,
and mechanical interfaces. TPDM features and executable functions are
monitored and checked out via the chase vehicle systems. The composite
structure is physically deployed without dependence on the TPDM system.
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2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
Rendezvous
This taskispurelyachasevehicletask.TPDM healthdataisrepeatedly
monitored.Thechasevehicleis responsiblefor placingthecomposite
systemwithin 50metersof thetargetspacecraftin anattitudefavorablefor
theTPDM ARAD system.It is assumedthattheGPSinformationin
conjunctionwith thechasevehiclerendezvousandtrackingradarwill
performthis function.
ProximityManeuvers(upto initial capturepositionandpre-rigidization)
This taskincludesall maneuveringrequiredto establishtheinitial capture
positionwith thetargetspacecraft.Initial capturepositionisdefinedas
havingall threetargetvehicleinterfaces(trunnions)within their associated
latchcaptureboundariesin anon-escapableconfiguration.
Whenthechasevehiclerendezvousandtrackingradarsystemdetermines
thatit is within 50metersof thetargetspacecraft,aholdpointis
established,duringwhichtherelativemovementbetweenthechasevehicle
referenceandtargetspacecraftis monitored.If therelativemovementis
within establishedcriteriaandtheoperatoreceivesdisplaydatathatthe
ARAD systemhas"seen"thetarget,thegroundoperatorenablesthecapture
commandandthechasevehicle(andattachedTPDM ) movesintocapture
positionusingARAD sensorsignals.Theinitial captureprocesscontinues
basedonchasevehiclemaneuveringjet firingsvia logic authority
establishedbytheARAD system.A preprogrammedapproachvector
profilewhichminimizesthrustingin thedirectionof thetargetspacecraftis
used.Hold pointsareenvisionedduringthemaneuveringprocess.If
operatorabortactionisnot taken,thismissionsequenceproceedsuntil latch
actuationsequencesoccurandthevehiclesattainthe initial captureposition.
TheTPDM latchclosuremotionis automaticallyactuatedby LED sensors
locatedlocally to eachlatch. Theseindicatewhenthetargetvehicle
trunnionspassthroughtheplaneof thelatchsensors.
Presentplanscall for latchactuationmovemento reachinitial capture
positionwithin threesecondsof receiptof the inboardLED sensorsignals
from anytwoof thethreelatchmechanismassemblies.At this point only
those two latch arms begin to move; the third latch mechanism arms will
move only when its inboard LED sensor provides an interrupt signal. Once
two of the latches reach the initial capture position, the chase vehicle
propulsion system is shut down, and the two latches continue to move
slowly until they reach a fully contained, non-rigid position, which also
forces the third fitting fully into capture.
Stabilization (initial capture position/pre-rigidization to rigidization)
Upon establishing that all three latches have reached their pre-rigidization
position (on the latch seat), the three latches restart their movement. This
movement sequence concludes with application of forces to rigidize the
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2.2.5
2.2.6
2.2.7
trunnionsagainstheirrespectivematingfittings. At thistime,signalsat
eachlatchlocationconfirmthatthefinal positionhasbeenattainedandthe
targetspacecraftis stabilizedandreadyfor transport.
Rendezvouswith On-orbitSupportSystem
Thechasevehiclepropulsionsystemis thenreactivatedby ground
operationsandpropelsthematedvehiclesto therendezvouslocation.
Releaseof TargetVehicle
Thechasevehicleis assumedstableat thetransferlocation.To execute
releaseof thepayloadfromthechasevehicle,theTPDM latchesare
activatedto thefull openposition.After afull openpositionsignalis
received,theTPDM is deactivatedin thefull openposition.
ChaseVehicle/'r'PDMStowage
TheTPDM remainsdeactivatedandplaysno rolein thistask.
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3 - Requirements
Based on the NASA/MSFC TPDM design information and the documents
received for review, we compiled the following requirement information:
• list of requirements identified in the documentation,
• tailoring of previously developed top level requirement information
from tumbling satellite retrieval application for TPDM use.
• discussion of requirement information relative to current application.
The most significant difference between the design basis of the previous
TPDM implementation and the current NASA/MSFC plan is the use of a
sensor to automate the mission tasks of approach and attaining initial capture
of the target spacecraft. This requires new requirements for system health
diagnostics, nominal mission status diagnostics and establishing the level of
desirable interaction between the ground control monitor and the ongoing
TPDM mission implementation.
• What information and level of diagnostics are required to provide a
basis for mission abort decisions?
• When and how many decision points (mission event times) should
be given to the ground control monitor to decide on continuing or
aborting the mission?
It is suggested that many of these operational type procedures will evolve from
operator response data and 'lessons learned' generated from 'remote' ground
simulations. These simulations are assumed to include the fidelity of quasi real-
time dynamics (motion and force interaction between the two vehicles).
3.1 Requirement Information from Document Review
Figure 3-1 lists the requirements identified from the documents reviewed.
Most of the entries were complied from the Reference 3 document
Preliminary Design Review for the Three Point Docking Mechanism Latch
Assembly. The list represents detailed requirement information and can be
used as a checklist to review the current NASA/MSFC design basis and
develop test performance parameters. When detail requirement statements
were not available, general entries were included due to their importance as
a basis for continuing TPDM development. In other cases, the OMV PDR
presentation documentation contained very detailed technical design data
which should be consulted directly. Refinements in the latch
assembly/sensors requirements were made subsequent to the OMV PDR
and are reflected in Section E of Fig. 3-1.
Stand alone equipment specifications Equipment Specification Three Point
Docking Mechanism (Reference 6) and Equipment Specification
Mechanical Control Electronics (MSE) (Reference 15) are available. These
documents are in a very usable form and have not been recompiled since the
OMV PDR.
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Figure 3-1, Sheet 1 of 6
Requirements Identified From Documentation
Assigned
number
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Summary of Categories
Category and Requirement Description
TPDM System
Latch Mechanism Assembly
Motor
Latch Assembly/EVA Drive
Latch Assembly/Sensors
Thermal
Materials and Process Requirements
Latch Assembly/Capture Arms
A
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
TPDM System
The TPDM provides a means by which the propulsion vehicle can capture
and dock with a payload on-orbit.
The TPDM provides the structural interface between the propulsion vehicle
and payload with a standard flight support system (FSS) docking interface.
In use, the TPDM latch assemblies mounted to the front face of the
propulsion vehicle. The latches shall be equi-spaced with each latch being
capable of being positioned to within a given angular tolerance to ensure
alignment with the corresponding berthing pin (trunnion) on the payload.
The TPDM shall be capable of accommodating a means of electrically
interfacing with a payload, as required.
The mechanisms are electrically redundant and are controlled by the
mechanism control electronics (MCE) located in the propulsion vehicle.
B
B1
B2
Latch Mechanism Assembly
The latch structure and mechanism shall be capable of withstanding the
applied loads including momentary loads applied during the containment
operation with a factor of 1.1 on yield stress and of 1.4 on ultimate stress.
The entire in-board surface of the latch shall be continuous in order to
accommodate any contact with the payload while docking
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B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
B9
B10
BII
BI2
BI3
B14
BI5
BI6
The latch width shall not exceed 3" maximum in the region of 8.95" to
16.41" above the mounting surface of the latch with the structure ring. The
outboard surface of the latch shall be continuous over this region in order to
accommodate any contact with the payload while docking.
EVA access shall be via a fiberglass cone and shall be perpendicular to the
in-board surface and parallel to the vehicle Y-Z plane.
The latch structure shall provide protection to the capture arms and locking
pawls in their retracted position.
The three latches shall be capable of being driven simultaneously or
independently with power supplied from the MCE.
The latches are required to operate on the ground and on-orbit, but not
during launch and landings.
Each latch is required to remain in a fully closed position without
continuous application of power.
Each latch is required to remain at the containment position when driven by
the MCE latch servo while on the ground and on-orbit.
The TPDM latch is required to capture a payload trunnion of 1.5020 inches
in diameter within the area specified on the source control drawing.
The TPDM latch backlash as measured at the latch arms shall not exceed 1.0
degree.
Each latch shall be capable of being operated via an EVA back-up drive with
given input torques:
• from the fully open to the closed and preloaded condition
• from the closed and preloaded condition to the fully open condition.
Each latch shall exert a minimum preload of 335 pounds on the captured
trunnion in the locked and preloaded position.
The TPDM latch drive system shall have a torque margin of 100% minimum
for the worst case conditions when operating under non-impact load
conditions and preload applications.
The TPDM latch drive motors and commutation sensors, position sensors
and the electro-optical proximity sensors shall be redundant.
Each latch shall incorporate redundant two-beam electro-optical proximity
sensors to sense a payload trunnion within the latch capture envelope
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B17
B18
B19
B20
B21
B22
B23
B24
B25"
B26"
B28
B29
B30
B31
B32
Figure 3-1, Sheet 3 of 6
Each latch shall be driven by a 3-phase reversible, DC brushless, motor
with given performance characteristics and motor parameters.
Each latch shall be capable of mating with a trunnion that is 165 degrees C
hotter or 240 degrees C colder than the TPDM latch mating surface.
The TPDM latch shall provide space for location of heaters and thermostats.
Each latch shall be designed with an adequate strength, stability and fatigue
resistance to preclude failure during all mission phases for a minimum life
of 10 years of orbital operations and 20 STS launches and landings with
maintenance.
The TPDM latch shall be capable of 500 latch-release cycles without
maintenance.
(assumed requirement) Each latch shall be capable of removing the preload
from the trunnion prior to letting go of the trunnion to ensure a zero-energy
release of the payload from the propulsion vehicle.
Combined in-plane and out-of-plane impact load of + TBD pounds and +
TBD pounds.
Capture arm containment load TBD in-lb.
Maximum width of 3" above a point TBD from the latch mounting surface
In-board surface to be fiat and continuous.
Redundant electro-optical sensors.
Enable unobstructed trunnion entry when arms fully open
Successfully pull in trunnion from anywhere within capture envelope
Pull trunnions through locking pawls
Provide over travel capability to ensure preload engagement without arms
being part of load path, i.e. no contact with trunnion from hardpoint to fully
closed position.
* These requirements may be driven by future payloads.
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CC1
D
D1
D2
D3
D4
D5
136
D7
D8
D9
E
E1
E2
E3
FA
E5
E6
Figure 3-1, Sheet 4 of 6
Motor
Brushless D.C., samarium cobalt magnets, Hall effect (latching)
commutation, 28 V operation, 4 quadrant drive, operation temperatures of
-25 to +71 degrees C
Latch Assembly/EVA Drive
EVA backup procedures as per MSFC - STD -512 - assume ratchet type
socket wrench
Provide EVA backup for electrical failures not mechanical
Operate latch via EVA backup from fully open to closed and pre-loaded
condition, and from closed and pre-loaded condition to fully open condition
Minimum torque to operate ratchet - 24 in. oz.
Maximum tool torque - 25 ft. lb.
Minimize number of turns
Assume full rotation (360 degrees) of tool available
Assume trunnion within capture envelope.
EVA access and drive nut requirements as specified on TBD.
Latch Assembly/Sensors
The Three Point Latch Trunnion Sensing (TPLTS) equipment requires an
electro-optical approach, two beams per redundant side (assumed parallel),
one detector and one emitter per beam, redundancy provided for by four
beams on the latch, and protection from trunnion impact.
Sense that the trunnion is in the initial capture position.
500 latch/release cycles.
Electro-optical proximity sensor redundancy **
Operate while exposed to direct sunlight per (NASA JPL SP43-38 VOL. 1
(Solar Array Design Handbook) **
Operating environment (TBD)**
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E7
E8
E9
El0
Ell
E12
Capability of trunnion to break both beams at one discrete position i.e.
'make before break'**
Bottom beam breaks when the trunnion enters and is completely inside the
capture envelope **
(derived) No critical emitting wavelengths - re: potential interference, both
radiated and susceptible **
(derived) No critical emitting modulation frequencies - re: potential
interference as above **
(derived) Operating life of 1000 hours **
(derived) No extraneous light sources **
** revised after OMV PDR
F
F1
Thermal
component temperature limits: non-operating (-65 to +80 degrees C);
qualification (-34 to +71 degrees C); acceptance (-24 to +61 degrees C)
G
G1
G2
Materials and Process Reauirements
Metallic: corrosion (MSFC-Specification-250); stress corrosion cracking
(MSFC-Specification-522)
Non-metallics: thermal vacuum stability (SP-R-0022); flammability
(NHB 8060.1)
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H
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
Latch Assemblv/Cavture Arms
Provide translational movement to the trunnion spring preload assembly to
exert a minimum preload of 335 pounds.
Maintain minimum preload throughout the thermal extremes experienced by
latch and trunnion
Maintain latch capture arm in fully closed position with no power applied to
motor.
Synchronize capture arm rotation to spring assembly travel to ensure no
interference to trunnion entering seat
Maintain minimum torque margin of 100% over entire drive rotational range
Maintain minimum resistive torque to operate EVA tool
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3.2 Requirements Derived From Tumbling Satellite Retrieval
Study (TSRS)
Figure 3-2 presents the requirement information from the tumbling satellite
retrieval report tailored for TPDM use. This information is of a preliminary
nature for a tumbling satellite mechanism nature and as such may not be
specifically relevant for the design basis definition of the MSFC/TPDM. It
reflects higher level information from which technical issues that need
resolution can be identified and detailed performance requirements can be
derived. Based on directed TPDM program objectives (i.e., what class of
satellite is to be included and what level of off-nominal condition or
configuration is to be considered within the capture envelope, i.e. spin,
nutation) and simulation test data, some of the requirement statements may
be challenged and modified.
We have also included the mission requirements identified at the
February 12, 1992 technical interchange meeting in the Figure 3-2 entries.
The requirements have been categorized as follows:
1. Mission
2. Safety
3. Operational
4. Functional (as pertinent to the TPDM subsystems)
- Structure
- Latch assembly
- Docking guidance sensor
- Electrical support subsystem
- Data management subsystem
- Thermal
5. Interfaces
- Target vehicle
- Remote Operations
• Ground Control Station
• Shuttle
• Space Station
- Ground Support Equipment
- Chase vehicle
These categories were selected to support the functional allocation planning
process between the chase vehicle and the TPDM hardware. We have
provided additional discussion in some of the entries ( in italics) to identify
issues that require resolution in the design process. These issues relate to
the areas of:
• definition of target satellite envelope characteristics
• available and consistent target aid location
• standoff distance of TPDM and target vehicle to avoid damage
potential to chase vehicle
• capability definition of TPDM to capture non-stationary satellites
3-8
• design load capability of TPDM/chase vehicle pertinent to jettison
loads and moments
• need for conducting analysis to minimize loads imparted to the
target satellite
• should any EVA intervention be designed into the TPDM
• a ve_ important focus on TPDM health status monitoring and
mission parameter analysis for automated abort decision making
• the need for tailored control station consoles.
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Figure 3-2, Sheet 1 of 6
Assigned
Number
•
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
Requirements Derived From TSR Program
Top Level TPDM Requirements by Category_
Mission
The TPDM is to support capture of a target satellite having an approximate
mass of 8,000 pounds when attached to a propulsion unit having a mass of
1,000 to 3,000 pounds. This mission calls for the TPDM to be attached to
the propulsion vehicle while being carried into LEO in the shuttle.
The TPDM is to support capture of a 40,000 pound payload when attached
to a 30,000 pound propulsion unit. This mission calls for the TPDM to be
capable of long term, multi-mission on-orbit operability, attached to the
propulsion vehicle in space.
The TPDM shall be capable of retrieving target vehicles having the required
capture interfaces: latch pins enabling berthing with the STS Flight Support
System and a specific alignment target, and a specified movement envelope
specification.
• The TPDM has to be designed based on a class of target vehicles, but still
with some off-nominal center of mass/movement flexibility to account for
partially deployed solar panels, appendages, etc.
• Different satellites may have limited space available for the target sensor,
and probably not the same location; perhaps a future integrated
trunnion target is possible with the sensor embodied in each latch assembly.
The TPDM shall be capable of disposal (controlled transfer or jettison) or
retrieval of target vehicle that have been augmented with the required capture
interfaces.
• The operational issues of controlled transfer between two vehicles in close
proximity must be addressed; does the TPDM release to the initial capture
position configuration prior to the transfer operation ?
The TPDM shall recover target satellites having irregular surfaces.
• This also addresses appendages andpoints out the desirability requirement
for flexibility of placement of the docking sensor.
The TPDM shall be flexible enough to capture target vehicles without prior
knowledge of the condition of the satellites, provided they are sufficiently
stable and structurally intact.
• It is desirable to provide some flexibility on configuration (partial
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1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
deployment of solar panels; hanging appendage resulting in off center loads).
The TPDM must resist the applied loads due to stabilizing the target vehicle.
• The issue surrounding this item pertains to just how much capability do
we want to build into the composite TPDM/chase vehicle in terms of
"capturing" non-stationary target vehicles. They may be spinning, and must
be stopped; they may be coning, giving rise to additional side loads.
The TPDM shall be capable of controlled jettison of the target vehicle.
• This brings up the issue of thruster loads during the jettison function
which may have slight moments (off the centerline thrust axis).
The capability of the TPDM/chase vehicle shall accommodate a limited
coning due to geometrical and principle axis offset.
• Aspresentlyplanned, the TPDM does not have this functional capability; it
must be allocated to a support structure, i.e. a spin table that provides
alignment with the target vehicle capture plane.
The target vehicle interfaces shall not be recessed and shall be located in an
accessible area.
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2.2
2.3
The TPDM mission shall be accomplished with minimum risk of damage to
the TPDM by establishing adequate operations procedures, sensory input,
automated emergency response, interface design, system robustness to
mitigate the potential for electrostatic discharge and inertia effects, contact
and dynamic loads, and fault detection.
• Leads to further definition of risk issue.
The TPDM will be able to capture target vehicles possessing hazardous
conditions without overly exposing the chase vehicle to risk or damage.
Minimum risk can be facilitated by jettison capability, loads analysis,
contamination analysis, operations procedures, and a standoff distance of
TBD.
• Question of "breakaway" design for TPDM in case loads are exceeded.
The nominal TPDM mission shall be accomplished with minimum risk of
damage to the target vehicle interface.
• This leads to an analysis of the tolerable contact and dynamics of the target
vehicle.
• Question of requiring the TPDM to include provisions for special damping
to avoid impact contact loads on the target vehicle - how does the impact
load capability of the target vehicle drive the TPDM design.
3.2
Operations
The TPDM shall accommodate timely and efficient on-orbit EVA and remote
telerobotic subsystems release and latch.
• Although no provision in the design for EVA intervention is available,
perhaps this should be included; human factors and operations procedures
and requirements from NSTS and SSF must be addressed if this capability
is included.
The TPDM mission will be accomplished within the chase vehicle's
propellant limitations.
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4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
Functional
The TPDM shall accommodate torques associated with capture,
stabilization, rigidization, and transport.
The TPDM will have a standoff distance of a minimum of TBD inches from
the chase vehicle to prevent inadvertent contact from the target vehicle. This
distance will consider a safety factor associated with potential hazards due to
the dynamics of capture.
• This may not be considered a real issue owing to the controlled cases
considered to be within the design basis. But, if inadvertent contact results
from extreme rebound velocities, contact between target vehicle and chase
vehicle is feasible; but do we consider it a credible event?
The TPDM will provide a structural, data, power, and thermal control
interface with the chase vehicle that does not require additional chase vehicle
augmentation.
• The options and functional allocations of the elements must be addressed.
They ma); in some cases be chase vehicle application dependent.
The propulsion vehicle shall match the target vehicle spin rate and phase
angle with sufficient accuracy to safely accomplish capture with the TPDM.
• The functional allocation of the capability to match spin rates and angular
effects must be addressed. Either the function has to be provided by the
chase vehicle, the TPDM assembly (adding hardware/software) or by
constraining the definition of an acceptable mission.
The TPDM shall be able to rigidize contact between the target vehicle and
chase vehicle sufficiently to allow chase vehicle attitude control and
propulsion systems transport of the combined structure.
The TPDM shall be capable of realigning with the geometric center of the
target vehicle trunnions with respect to the chase vehicle major axis after
stabilization is performed.
• Target vehicle alignment is important for umbilical interface control. For
stationary vehicles, the centering action is feasible concurrent with TPDM
docking. If motion matching is first required before attaining the initial capture
position, we may want to hold the centering requirement until we are ensured
of a stable configuration to work with. This requires further stud),.
The contact with the target vehicle shall not impose damage to the TPDM.
The TPDM/chase vehicle shall be capable of emergency release.
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4.9
4.10
4.11
Initial contact with the target satellite will facilitate allowing the latching
alignment to be adjusted prior to rigidizing the interface.
• Consistent with NASA/MSFC approach.
The TPDM missions will be accomplished within the automated control
limits, and chase vehicle and TPDM dead bands.
The TPDM shall be able to perform all phases of the missions within
subsystem thermal limits.
•
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
Interfaces
The chase vehicle will supply all mission support functions, power and data
requirements.
The TPDM shall be chase vehicle compatible with no impact on the chase
vehicle reference configuration.
The dynamic and inertial loads induced by the TPDM operation shall not
impart loads upon the chase vehicle or target vehicle beyond their
established limits.
The TPDM ground control systems requirements will be integrated into the
chase vehicle ground station.
Telemetry Support - The control station will be capable of processing
commands, status and housekeeping telemetry data which will be
transmitted and received through the chase vehicle C&DH. All TPDM
commands will be archived.
Fault detection & diagnostics support - The control station will support fault
detection and diagnostics during TPDM operations. The operator will be
alerted of faults, failures, or out-of-limit conditions. Raw data and
parameters will be accessible.
The TPDM stowed diameter shall not exceed the shuttle cargo bay envelope
diameter.
Stowage of the TPDM in the shuttle cargo bay shall require a minimum
distance along the centerline of the cargo bay.
• Notedforpurpose ofplanning in case a support arm & spin table is
required to execute off nominal cases.
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5.9
5.10
5.11
TPDM operations shall be accomplished within the space shuttle workload
limitations and per integration and launch procedures and constraints as
defined in the NSTS Payload Integration Plan.
• Operational requirement to be determined.
The TPDM shall accommodate horizontal or vertical STS payload
integration.
The TPDM will require a minimum of stowage and housekeeping resources
for on-orbit or vertical SSF stowage.
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4 - TPDM Latching Sequence Analysis
4.1
4.1.1
TPDM Assembly Description
The TPDM consists of 3 latches which attach to a structural member on the
delivery vehicle and data and electrical interfaces. The latches are located on
a 36" radius and are equally spaced 120 degrees apart. The TPDM is
fastened to the capture vehicle by bolts. Figure 4-1 shows the TPDM
attached to a chase vehicle. Please note the coordinate system shown on the
figure is used in this study effort; it is consistent with that from the OMV
Program.
Latch Mechanism
As shown is Fig. 4-2, each latch mechanism consists of two 5/8" thick
aluminum alloy machined plates that are fastened together with bolts and
spacers. The spacers provide a gap of 1-3/4" between each plate. Two
aluminum arms (material same as plate material) are mounted between the
two plates. The arms are driven by a reversible DC motor. The motor is
activated by redundant two-beam electro-optical proximity sensors and the
overall TPDM latch actuation logic. Two pairs of light beam sensors
contained in each latch machine plate illuminate respective photo-detectors
positioned directly opposite across the width of the capture envelope (an
alternate geometry would have all sensors on the inboard side).
The LED sensors provide a two step capture actuation sequence. Latch arm
electrical arming will be initiated according to an overall control algorithm
based on two trunnions passing their respective outer LED sensors. This
overall control logic electrically arms all motors and starts selected latch arm
movement based on trunnion interrupt signals. Initial latch arm movement
occurs when one interrupt signal is received from each of two latch plate
LED sets. The signals are generated when the beams are blocked from their
respective receivers by the passing trunnions. Once the latch arms are
activated, they first capture (envelop) and then may guide (through contact)
the trunnion firmly towards the latch seat. The point at which the latch arm
may contact the trunnion is dependent on the relative speed of the vehicles
and the path of the trunnion within the latch envelope. The movement
envelope of a trunnion within a latch arm, assuming a nominal travel path is
shown on Fig. 4-3. The travel of each arm from full open position to initial
capture position takes approximately about 3 seconds; the initial capture
position is defined as the dual latch arm position which just envelopes the
trunnion diameter, preventing it from escaping. Fig. 4-4 shows the position
of the arms against the trunnion in a position that just prevents escape.
Once the two initiating arms reached their initial capture position, movement
towards the pre-rigidization position (trunnion located in the seat of the
latch) proceeds slowly (about 60 seconds). Each trunnion is then firmly
seated by the locking pawl mechanical action engagement and the arm
motors are deactivated based on resolver sensor data.
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4.1.2
Presently, the logic for TPDM latch movement requires that:
1 - at least two trunnions interrupt their respective inner electro-optical
beams; this actuates _the motors for those latches. These
latches then move rapidly (in about 3 seconds) to the initial capture
position defined by the arm tips being closer than the diameter of
the trunnion. The activated latches continue moving slowly to the
pre-rigidization position (taking about 60 seconds).
2 - the remaining latch only starts moving when its inner beam is
broken by the remaining trunnion path; the arms reach the initial
capture position rapidly and then continue moving slowly to the
pre-rigidization position.
3 - all arms move to the pre-rigidization position independently and
wait until all three arrive at that position.
4 - all latch mechanisms execute their linkage movements to attain
hard dock (rigidization) simultaneously.
Automated Rendezvous and Docking System (ARAD)
(This is a ypical carrier vehicle system - shown here for information only)
The purpose of this sensor is to guide the chase vehicle to a controlled
docked condition with the target vehicle. It assumes navigational control of
the chase vehicle when it is approximately 50 meters from the target vehicle;
prior to that another radar guidance and tracking system would be used to
establish general vicinity proximity and desired attitude relationship with the
target vehicle.
The sensor presently being investigated by NASA/MSFC for use in this
application is composed of two parts. The first part is the sensor which
consists of a video camera ringed with two wavelengths of laser diode. The
second part is a standard Remote Manipulator System (RMS) target used on
the orbiter that has three circular pieces of reflective tape covered by optical
filters which correspond to one of the wavelengths of laser diode. The sensor
is on the chase vehicle and the target is on the target vehicle. The ARAD
system works by pulsing one wavelength laser diodes and taking a picture.
Then the second wavelength laser diodes are pulsed and a second picture is
taken. One picture is subtracted from the other and the resultant picture is
thresholded. All adjacent pixels above threshold are blobbed together (X and
Y centroids calculated). All blob centroids are checked to recognize the target
out of noise. Then the three target spot centroids are used to evaluate the roll,
yaw, pitch, range, azimuth, and elevation. From that a guidance routine can
guide the chase vehicle with the correct orientation. 12
The location of the sensor on the chase vehicle TPDM has not been
finalized. Its location may vary due to the availability of space for the
sensor target on the target vehicles. For the purposes of this study, a
location was chosen that places the target 30" beyond the plane of the
trunnion fitting centerline at a radius beyond the latches. The sensor
reference plane is assumed to be located in the Y-Z plane at a distance 30"
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4.1.4
outboardfrom thetrunnionfitting centerlinewhenthetwo vehiclesarein a
dockedconfiguration.Pleasereferto Section4.2below.
Structure& VehicleMountingSurface
(This is a typical carrier vehicle system - shown here for information only)
The structure is a beam casting with a bolt ring used to affix the TPDM onto
the chase vehicle surface.
Target Satellite Interfaces
Currently a single TPDM latch design is planned for use to interface with
two types of target vehicles. Each target vehicle latch mating configuration
is slightly different. The two configurations are follows:
Explorer
The Explorer satellite is fitted with three trunnion pins, spaced 120 degrees on a
radius consistent with the TPDM latch assembly location and an autodocking target
located in the plane of the hard dock position. Please refer to Section 4.2 for a
further discussion of the autodocking target.
Each trunnion is fabricated from an aluminum alloy plate. The capture portion of
the trunnion is a 1-1/2" diameter bar approximately 4" long. The bar has an
integrally machined five-sided base, wide enough to accommodate four
installation bolts. As shown in Fig. 4-5, the overall length of the trunnion is
4.618". The nominal mating position of the latch and trunnion is 1.3" from the
end of the trunnion. In this location, the outboard latch plate extends 0.22"
beyond the trunnion end and the centerline of the two-beam electro-optical
proximity sensors is 0.11" inboard of the trunnion end (alternately locating all
sensors on the inboard side would eliminate this problem).
Fig. 4-6 shows the nominal clearance between the inboard TPDM latch plate and
fitting fillet radius to be 1.1 inches. Since the trunnions are mounted on the side of
the satellite, no clearance issue exists in the direction of motion beyond the trunnion.
In the current design, the resolvers are mounted inboard. Users must determine if
this resolver location creates a clearance problem for the specific payload.
Hubble Space Telescope (HST)
The HST includes a trunnion towel bar design. Each of the three towel bars
are fabricated from aluminum alloy plate. They are, in a similar fashion to
the trunnions, spaced 120 degrees on a radius consistent with the TPDM
latch assembly locations. The machined part is 3" wide, 12-1/4" long and
7 1/2" deep. The capture portion of the towel bar has a circular cross
section 1.5" in diameter and 6.75" long. The centerline of the bar is 6.34"
from the mounting base. The nominal mating position is in the center of the
1.5" diameter bar as shown in Fig. 4-7. This location provides a nominal
clearance of 1.86" on each side of the towel bar as shown in Fig. 4-8.
Figure 4-9 shows the latch in the docked position and with the arms in a
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position that reflects the minimum clearance between it and the towel bar
base. This distance is 0.19"; the latch arm should have passed this position
prior to reaching the seated configuration.
Autodocking was not planned for the HST, therefore, there is no suitable
autodocking sensor target on the HST.
4.2
4.2.1
Auto Docking Sensor Tolerance Study
The final docking operation is performed using the ARAD system
controlling the movement of the chase vehicle to dock with the target
vehicle. It is assumed that the target vehicle is relatively stationary. The
ARAD sensor was located 37.3" from the center of the three latches. The
sensor target was located on the target vehicle in the plane of the hard dock
position (using the centerline of the target vehicle trunnion/towel bar as a
reference) as shown on Fig. 4-10. In the docked configuration, the ARAD
sensor is separated by 30" from the target (see Fig. 4-10).
In this study we analyzed the mating configuration that would result from
application of alignment errors between the ARAD system and target vehicle
alignment aid (sensor target). In the nominal case where no alignment errors
are considered, the two vehicles would approach each other along the X-axis
vector parallel to the Y-Z plane. The application of alignment errors places the
target vehicle trunnion fittings (mating latch interfaces) at an angle and slightly
skew to the nominal latch mechanism capture plane and direction vector.
Application of TPDM Orientation
The coordinate system used in this study is equivalent to that of the OMV
Program. As shown in Fig. 4-1, the chase vehicle/TPDM travels along the X-
axis in the plane of the Y-Z axes to perform its docking maneuver. The ARAD
sensor, located at a radius of 37.3" from the X axis vector, generates signals
guiding the chase vehicle's travel along the X-axis vector to perform docking.
In this study we have introduced the effects of ARAD sensor alignment error by
applying translations and rotations _ 0.2" in the three transitional axes and +
0.33 degrees in the three rotational axes) to the nominal position of the trunnion
(using its centerline as a reference) in a manner to maximize the distance between
new (apparent) location and original location.
The errors were applied one at a time, with each succeeding error direction
selected to increase the error magnification. The resultant effect shifts
direction vector on the chase vehicle centroid by: 1.49 degrees relative to the
original X axis, 1.15 degrees relative to the original Y axis, and 0.48
degrees relative to the original Z axis.
Imposing this total error alters the position and path of each latch relative to its
associated target satellite interface. Our selection of the sensor at 180 degrees from
the furthest latch provides a maximum change on the capture envelope of that latch.
As shown in Fig. 4-10, in a view looking forward, the TPDM latches are
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4.2.2
positioned in the 4, 8, and 12 o'clock positions. The target sensor was located
37.3" from the center of the three latches in the 6 o'clock position to maximize
the effective angulation resulting from incorporating the alignment errors.
Case 1 - Explorer Platform
The following discussion describes the resultant change at each latch
location, the worst case being at the 12 o'clock position. For purpose of
initial analysis, we assumed that each trunnion is allowed to pass completely
into the latch without the arm hindering its progress (the possibility of
contact will be addressed later) and without considering the effect of overall
TPDM latch closure control logic. The final position that would be reached
is described; bounce effects are not considered. After we provide
conclusions on the final positions, we provided a discussion of the effects
of speed, latch control logic, and latch contact during the process.
We used the nominal 36" radius of the latch arm/trunnion interface as the
location at which to impose the alignment errors. Taking this target point as
Point (Pt) 0, as shown in Fig. 4-11, and imposing the alignment errors
one at a time, the movements imposed were:
a°
b.
C.
d.
Translated 0.2" in the X, Y, & Z direction (Pt 1)
Pitched +0.33 degrees about the Y axis (Pt 2)
Roll +0.33 degrees about the X axis (Pt 3)
Yaw +0.33 degrees about the Z axis (Pt 4)
The new location for Pt 0 is Pt 4. Pt 0 moved 0.62" in the +X direction,
0.80" in the +Y direction and 0.20" in the +Z direction. Assuming the
target vehicle remains fixed and all alignment errors were introduced on the
chase vehicle, this would skew the side of the chase vehicle on which the
ARAD sensor is mounted forward (towards the target vehicle), and the latch
furthest from the ARAD sensor away from the target vehicle.
Based on the assumed orientation, the latches closer to the sensor location
would arrive first. It was assumed that no bounce effects would occur and
the latch retaining motion between the chase vehicle/target vehicle would
make the vehicles become "parallel" in the off-nominal position. The latch
furthest away from the sensor would reach its final position last.
The results of the translations at each latch location are as follows:
a. The far side of the outboard latch machine plate at the 12 o'clock
position was 0.42" outboard of the trunnion; its electro-optical sensors
would not be interrupted by the trunnion and therefore could not
participate in latch arm motor activation. Please refer to Fig. 4-12.
b. The near side of the outboard latch plate at the 4 o'clock position
was 0.18" outboard of the trunnion. The electro-optical sensors
in this plate would not be interrupted by the trunnion and could
not actuate the latch arm motor. The inboard sensor would still
actuate the latch arm motor. Please refer to Fig. 4-13.
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c. Both sides of the latch assembly located at 8 o'clock are
positioned such that their electro-optical sensors would activate its
latch arm motor. The near side of the inboard latch plate at the 8
o'clock position clears the trunnion fillet radius by 0.10". Please
refer to Fig. 4-14.
To preclude the undesirable conditions above, the following could be
performed:
a. Relocate the trunnions 0.90" toward the vehicle center. Maintain
the nominal mating position on the 36" radius and increase the pin
length by 1.80". While this change is more easily implemented
on an HST type vehicle, it could be considered for future target
satellites assuming the STS Flight Support System interface is
maintained.
b. A second solution would be to position the latches at a radius of
36.9" and increase the pin length by 1.80".
Figure 4-15 shows all three latch assemblies in their final docked position.
From the layout on Fig. 4-15 we see that the capture could still be made based
on the geometry. We will revisit this comment in the review of the HST.
The latch actuation control logic initially postulated called for all latches to
start their closure movement once the first trunnion passed the inner beam
location of any latch. We refer to this as the "first-in" control basis. Using
this premise, we considered the potential for any of the other two latches to
be outside of the latching envelope at the instant when the latches are
actuated. In our "first-in" study case, the first two latch arms essentially
start moving in unison because both would pass their inner beams at about
the same time. We found that the trunnion at the 12 o'clock position was
marginally within the capture envelope assuming no other relative motion
(closure) occurs between the two vehicles. See Fig. 4-16. Based on the
position of the latch arms without considering the potential for dynamic
"pull-in" effects from the other latches or relative motion, the former (12
o'clock) may bind the latch arms or remain outside of the closing arms. It
appears that two of the three latch mechanism arms would still capture their
respective trunnions but the planned rigidization point might not be reached
due to the potential skewed capture position. However, when we applied
the current control logic as discussed in Section 4.1.1, the potential for the
last latch to bind with or remain outside of the closing arms is eliminated.
The position of the guidance sensor affects the nominal latch/trunnion
position mismatch. Generally, the effect is magnified as the distance
between the sensor and the latch location increases. Figure 4-17 shows the
projected deviation of final docked position relative to the nominal (0,0)
location in the Y-Z plane versus sensor distance from the (0,0) Y-Z
location. Two data points are indicated; the first (0.8") being the deviation
at the 12 o'clock position for the sensor located at a radius of 37.3" and the
second (0.58") the deviation for the sensor located at the vehicle centerline
location. In the latter case we used a 30" distance between the ARAD
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4.2.3
sensor and its target in a hard docked position. While this is not realistic
because the target would be within the body of the target vehicle, it still
conveys the effect of the parameter which is important for planning
umbilical connection alignment. This implies, from a purely geometric error
consideration, that the best sensor location is in the center of the TPDM
(along the X direction vector).
Case 2 - Hubble Space Telescope
The same methodology was applied to the HST towel bars. For this vehicle
configuration there was no instance where any of the electro-optical sensors
were positioned to not provide interrupt signals.
The results of the translations at each latch location are as follows:
a. The centerline of the latch assembly at the 12 o'clock position shifted
0.2" outboard of its nominal location, providing a minimum clearance
of 1.47" to the outboard towel bar end plate. All its electro-optical
sensors would be interrupted by the towel bar and therefore the latch
arm motor would be activated. Please refer to Fig. 4-18.
bo The centerline of the latch assembly at the 4 o'clock position
shifted 0.59" outboard of its nominal location, providing a
minimum clearance of 1.27" to the outboard towel bar end plate.
All its electro-optical sensors would be interrupted by the towel bar
and therefore the latch arm motor would be activated. Please refer
to Fig. 4-19.
C. The centerline of the latch assembly at the 8 o'clock position
shifted 0.79" inboard from its nominal location, providing a
minimum clearance of 1.07" to the inboard towel bar end plate. All
its electro-optical sensors would be interrupted by the towel bar and
therefore the latch arm motor would be activated. Please refer to
Fig. 4-20.
Figure 4-21 shows all three latch assemblies in their final docked position.
The mismatch (between vehicle centerlines) is 0.8", assuming the latches
are captured at their new position. This figure is significant for evaluating
allowable tolerance for feed-through type servicing fittings (i.e. propellant
transfer).
Finally, we again considered the potential for any of the latches to be
outside of the latching envelope. Again two latch actuation control logic
cases were considered; the "first-in" case as discussed in the prior section
(where all latches move at the instant when the first latch is actuated) and the
current control logic case. As discussed for the Explorer case above, we
found that the improved logic of the current latch control sequence
eliminated the concern for any latch being outside of the capture envelope
once the latch arms began their movements. Please refer to the discussion
in the above section for details. This analysis also does not consider the
effects of extremely rapid bounce-back between vehicles.
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Fig. 4-21 View of TPDM latches - composite effect of alignment errors applied to towel bars
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4.3 Alternate Capture Sensor/Capture Mechanism Concepts
The following paragraphs describe suggested changes to the interim TPDM
design and documents comments which lead to the current latch actuation
logic.
Assuming two latch arms are activated (with the third not in place yet for
activation), each of the two latches travel an arc of approximately 4 inches to
reach the initial capture position; this takes approximately 3 seconds (design
parameter not firm). For a stipulated maximum final docking velocity of
0.1 cm/sec (.0394 in/sec) the latch arms should not contact the trunnions
unless rebounding action takes place.
The remaining latch will move only when its inner beam is broken. For the
worst case condition (Explorer scenario), the first latch to break the inner
beam is 2.95" away from its contact point on the latch structure. Since it
takes approximately 60 seconds for the latch to reach its pre-rigidization
position and with the maximum relative postulated travel rate between the
two vehicles being 0.1 cm/sec, the first trunnion is expected to travel
.0394 x 60 = 2.364" further into the capture envelope during this process.
This implies that it would finally contact 15 seconds
[(2.95" - 2.364")/.0394 inches per sec.]
after the latch reached its initial capture position. The worst case trunnion is
3.13" away from its projected contact point when the first latch arm starts to
move. This implies that it should break its inner beam 11 seconds after the
first arm starts moving. The latch arms for the worst case trunnion will
reach their initial capture position 4 seconds prior to first latch contact. The
worst case trunnion is projected to make contact approximately 5 seconds
after first latch contact. Based on the above parameters, the initial two
trunnions could "bounce" off their respective latch plates and rebound
towards the latch arms only after they would have reached their initial
capture positions. The same is true for the remaining trunnion. If the initial
capture position is approximately equal to the trunnion diameter, the
rebound contact point could be close to the tip (see Fig. 4-4), resulting in a
high moment arm and contact impact load. It is recommended that a review
be made to establish the soft capture position is at least full tip to tip overlap.
Consideration was also given to moving the inner beams more inboard,
towards the base of the structure. Based on the above analysis, this is not
suggested. It could lead to earlier rebounding with high closing speeds,
before the latch arms fully contain their respective trunnions. The concern
for "bouncing" off the latch plates suggests additional review for including
mechanical dampers between the TPDM structure and chase vehicle. This
may soften the bounce, but a detailed dynamics model is required to
adequately affirm this conclusion.
The potential for X-axis misalignment still exists, including cases where the
LEDs on the one side of the latch arm assemblies would be beyond the
trunnion and could not provide actuation signals. This condition (see Fig.
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4-15andFig.4-21)canbediminished by incorporating alignment guides
on the outboard side of each latch mechanism which provide a centering
action force while the latches draw the target satellite trunnions in towards
its final position; this is important for umbilical connection applications.
This change also diminishes the constraints on ARAD sensor/target errors
and vehicle thruster control accuracy. The alignment guide slide surface can
also be curved to help in centering the trunnion relative to the latch
mechanism. Further changes to facilitate the centering action are to place
spherical bearings on the latch arm surfaces that contact the trunnion surface
and add grease to the surfaces to lower friction; these would facilitate the
sliding action towards the center position. Should any of the bearings seize,
we would revert to the present design (sliding between two surfaces).
Assuming a worst case contact geometry, the minimum clearance between
the HST towel bar assembly and the latch mechanism arm is 0.19". A
further review towards increasing the elevation of the towel bar off the
vehicle base is suggested on future vehicles.
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5 - Flight Issues
To minimize risk in proceeding into the flight hardware phase with a design
that includes an automated control capability, specific issues require
resolution. This section identifies these issues and discusses their
relevance. The next section (Section 6) proposes test simulation methods
that could be used to resolve them.
As a vehicle for identifying issues, we prepared a matrix chart that lists the
elements of a mission scenario (from Section 2 of this report) and identifies
the some of the major issues. To resolve an issue, it must be demonstrated
that the mission task is feasible, based on ground simulation or analysis
results. The issue/mission element matrix is presented in Figure 5-1. Three
major areas stand out:
development of a docking sensor system which can function in real
time, based on illuminated sensor data cross-linked into an
onboard propulsion system,
• docking dynamic effects, the case where the two vehicles are close
to the same relative mass, and
providing a higher level of control integral to the TPDM system to
support automated docking and initiating abort when data requires;
this issue also includes the transmission of limited data down to
the ground control station for operator information/abort override
action.
To facilitate discussion of issues, Figure 5-2 correlates them to subsystems
comprising the chase vehicle/TPDM system. This presentation approach
drives out requirements.
In the following paragraphs we discuss each of the issues identified.
5.1 Health Monitoring Information/abort Criteria
Lessons learned from TPDM simulation results performed in Grumman's
Large Amplitude Space Simulator indicate high operator work load for
teleoperated capture operations. From a human factors viewpoint, the
effects peaked when capture of spinning satellites with assumed data
transmission time delay was attempted. The automated docking operation
approach, limiting the operator to an override abort function based on
filtered data appears realistic.
The health monitoring information issue relates to the selection of real-time
data from which the system should take abort measures. To some degree,
an abort decision could be made from the ground in a timely manner, but
based on postulated contact dynamics scenarios (and experience with
Intelsat capture) it is proposed that higher level control logic be "built in" to
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the onboard system. The response time requirement appears too short
relative to the anticipated data transmission time delays.
Candidate data to support the automated abort function will include latch
force measurements from sensors located at the latches and target motion
thresholds, as measured by the ARAD system. The refinement of the data
parameters will be derived from future ground development testing.
"Fuzzy logic control" is a rule based control approach which has potential
application to this problem. Several studies have been performed applying
this approach to Shuttle orbital rendezvous problems. The results have
shown very good performance in comparison to a human pilot.
5.2 Recognition of Target Vehicle ARAD Targets
Current laboratory data infers that the system will acquire the target at 50
meters. This ability must be confirmed with simulated testing under space
environmental conditions. While sun reflection is not expected to disrupt
signals, the effect of chase vehicle jitter due to steady state harmonics,
potential station keeping maneuvering jet firings, and potential target satellite
movement must be analyzed. Also at issue is the effect of the target being
skew to the sensor.
5.3 Target Vehicle Movement Due to Chase Vehicle Jet Plume
Effects
When the chase vehicle maneuvers close to the target vehicle, the chase
vehicle thrusters may generate disturbance torques on the target vehicle.
This case will be especially evident if the target satellite has deployed solar
panels, extending from its body. There are approach orientations that
minimize the need for forward thruster firings; these should be evaluated
along with chase vehicle plume deflectors which lower the efficiency of X-
vector movement, but redirect the plume to beyond the effective geometry of
the target vehicle.
5.4 Chase Vehicle Thrust Vector Stability
Chase vehicle disturbance inputs to the ARAD system (i.e. thrusting,
attitude control system) must fall within the disturbance rejection capability
of the ARAD system.
5.5 Chase Vehicle Orientation Update Based on ARAD Sensor Data
The OMV program evaluated various automated docking technologies.
From information available on the ARAD application, the orientation error
between two ARAD measurement cycles produces updated chase vehicle
propulsion thruster control system signals (deviation from planned
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direction,speedandacceleration).Thechasevehiclecontrolsystemshould
becapableof acceptingcommandupdatesat aminimumrateequalto the
ARAD update rate.
5.6 TPDM Latch Closure Criteria & Speed
Docking can be theoretically planned (as laid out in Section 4 of this report)
for ideal and off-nominal cases; however, its ultimate verification is
dependent on a completing a multitude of cases affected by contact
dynamics sensor response time and control algorithm feedback dynamics.
Based on postulated criteria, rules for successful engagement must be
developed; these will be used to form the basis for acceptable automated
procedures.
5.7 Two Body Dynamics
The aim of initial capture is to attain a docking (non escapable) condition
with minimum disturbance to the target vehicle. The analysis in Section 4
suggests that contact bouncing between the chase and target vehicles
probably will occur (to some degree). The objective is to establish an initial
capture position prior to any contact.
Beyond the initial capture issue, the thrust vector control authority for the
chase vehicle must also accommodate the added weight and altered center of
mass condition of the newly joined target vehicle. While this is more of a
design problem, it is mentioned for completeness.
5.8 Target Vehicle Centering Criteria
The requirement to perform umbilical transfer fluids or power connection
after capture, places additional restraints on the capture geometry. A
centerline-to-centerline tolerance of approximately _.+1/8 inch is generally
desirable for umbilical insertion. From the initial review performed, it
appears that a positive design solution which supports centering is needed.
The umbilical transfer function, albeit performed with a nominal alignment
condition, would be improved if some relative movement between vehicles
were possible to relieve stresses during probe insertion.
5.9 Target Vehicle Handoff
The issue in this case could involve the dynamics of three bodies in space.
Typical scenarios could take the form of:
• a delivery of the target vehicle to the space station
(repair/maintenance/logistics center),
• transfer directly to shuttle RMS (believed not to be within present
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NSTSsafetycriteria),
• ajettisonof thetargetvehicleinto theatmosphere,or
• aparkingof thetargetvehiclein aselectedorbit/location
Themajorissueis thepotentialeffectof thrusterplumeon thedesiredstable
conditionof thetargetvehicleafterreleasefrom thechasevehicle.
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6 - TPDM Issue Resolution
This section examines the flight issues in the prior section and proposes a
development program to resolve them. In the discussion of the various
approaches comprising the development program, acknowledgment and
infusion of completed and ongoing development work is included; omission
of any relevant work should not be taken negatively since a complete
literature search was not performed.
The general aim is to resolve all issues using a ground test/analysis program
to a point where only a flight demonstration can provide the remaining
verification (i.e., true two-body dynamic interactions and performance of
in-situ automated docking). Thereafter, planning for an operational flight
capability can proceed with a minimum of uncertainty.
Figure 6-1 and 6-2 presents flight issues identified in Section 5 correlated to
proposed approaches for resolution. More detailed issue descriptions are
also shown; these can be derived from the more general items identified
originally. We have used a coding on the chart that indicates the suggested
primary approach (P) that would resolve the issue; other approaches (S)
which can provide effective contributions; and approaches that provide
confirmatory data (C), thereby further reducing risk.
As identified by Fig. 6-1 and 6-2, various computer software
analysis/simulation tools can contribute; an integrated approach that
establishes data/results correlation with testing will minimize the final risk.
As shown by Fig. 6-1, most of the issues pertinent to the TPDM system
should be resolved once the ground demonstration is completed. Only
those areas which pertain to space contact dynamics must receive
confirmatory level resolution through a flight demonstration. The ground
simulation test program should provide a strong basis for projection of
flight results. Figure 6-2 presents the issues pertinent to the vehicle systems
associated with the TPDM. These generally include the ARAD sensor,
chase vehicle and data transmission to the ground station. This area is more
dependent on the results of a flight demonstration to establish a basis issue
resolution.
6.1 Design & Analysis
NASA/MSFC has undertaken the modification and upgrade of the TPDM to
address issues that improve the probability of successful capture. These
changes include a wider and deeper latch mechanism capture envelope and
other changes to the structure, mechanism subsystems and capture control
algorithms (including a more autonomous operation).
Design work has proceeded to a point where a new latch mechanism design
has been completed. Integration with flight type structure has not been
addressed beyond the concept level. Most of the TPDM related issues will
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be resolved using design and analysis approaches. Similar equipment
(materials, controls elements, mechanisms) have been flight qualified
before, only the application arrangement and control methodology must be
verified. No enabling technology problems must be solved.
It is suggested that a systems approach be taken now to ensure that all
requirements are identified and complied with, and integration parameters
are identified early in the process. While these items may not directly relate
to resolving technical issues, they support the identification and
performance specification of the subsystems comprising the TPDM system.
The TPDM source material (earlier generation design information) carries
valuable data which may direct resolution approaches. Earlier selection of
constraint criteria for items such as chase vehicle jitter requirements,
processor cycle time, and desirable propulsion thruster level may facilitate
and aid in-process engineering activities.The health monitoring system is a
higher level control application which must be developed to support mission
operations and component diagnostics requirements, including fault tree
decision analysis. There does not appear to be any enabling technology
issue in this area. Once developed, adequate time and opportunity is
available for confirmation of design and requirement verification.
Beside the initial system design task, the resolution of issues surrounding
ARAD system use for this application awaits stand-alone feasibility testing,
with the host chase vehicle propulsion system integration being a
subsequent further step. The vehicle thrust vector stability with current use
of auxiliary front-end kit systems was an ongoing issue on the OMV
program; this application must be tested to ensure design compatibility or
identification of additional requirements.
Work has been performed on capture algorithms selection and collecting
data on resulting loads and dynamic effects on the mechanisms and attached
structure. The bulk of this effort comes from the OMV program efforts.
The requirements for target vehicle centering must be firmed up. Presently
the TPDM design does not promote centering of the target vehicle beyond
that of the initial ARAD system alignment control. It appears that TPDM
auxiliary kits (fluid transfer, electrical umbilcals) may require a tight
centering tolerance. Even if the ARAD system provides exacting tolerances,
movement during rigidization may bring about misalignments. It is
suggested that a supportive design solution be considered. Please refer also
to section 4.3.
6.2 Computer Simulation
As indicated on Fig. 6-1 and Fig. 6-2, computer modeling is seen as a
support approach. Its value for the TPDM program is in two areas:
dynamic modeling and controls simulation.
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6.2.1
6.2.2
DynamicModeling
BasedonGrummanfundedwork, it becameapparenthatrobotic
simulationsoftwarecouldeffectivelysupportfunctionalmissiontask
analysisandconcurrentdesignby exposingproblemsof in-processdesign
configurations.It enablesfunctionalmodelingof designsolutionsandrun-
throughs(simulations)of tasksprior to committingto hardware,mockups,
models,or evenexpensivetesting.With theavailabilityof softwarethat
performsdynamicmodeling,it is suggestedthatthisavenuebeconsidered
with theunderstandingthatit cannotreplacesimulationtesting,only
augmentandfacilitateitssuccess.
As atypicalexample,ADAMS isa CAEprogramthatsolvesforjoint
position,displacement,velocity,acceleration,totalandpotentialenergy,
andmodelinternalreactionforces.It performsassemblystatic,kinematic,
inversedynamicanddynamicanalysis.Animationof flexiblebodiesis
available.Modelscanincludebothrigid andflexiblebodiesandmakeuse
of librariesof components,joints, andforces. Resultsareusedto evaluate
mechanicalsystemperformance,rangeof motion,collisions,peakloads,
andtocalculatefiniteelementanalysisloadinputs.Automatically calculated
outputs include all displacements, velocities, accelerations, and reaction
forces.
Use of a software program such as the former is expected to drive out
design issues and provide added credibility prior to running "full-up"
facility tests. Beside the modeling of hardware, test plan procedures can be
verified by "running" mission scenarios using the software graphic
presentation formats. Data results can be forecasted, to act as guideline test
parameters. A further integration of the dynamics program and a control
simulation is possible; this requires additional study.
The areas in Fig. 6-1 and Fig. 6-2 can all be investigated with the indicated
simulation techniques.
Controls Simulation
Simulation of the integrated control system (chase vehicle control, ARAD) can
be performed non-real time and real time. A number of control analysis tools
are available to perform off-line non-real time analyses (such as ACSL,
MATLAB). Mathematical models of the target and chase vehicle dynamics can
be developed and integrated with models of the ARAD system.
Real time control simulation can be performed in a ground test simulation
facility where the contact dynamics issue can be adequately addressed.
6.3 Ground Test Simulation
The facility requirements for TPDM development are available at
NASA/MSFC. Grumman also has a simulation facility which could
support the effort. The issues to be addressed focus on the integrated use of
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6.3.1
theARAD sensorto performthedockingoperation,andcontactdynamics
betweenthechaseandtargetvehicles.
In view of the importance of the latch mechanism function relative to the
capture issue, it is suggested that a priority be given towards development
of flight-like mechanisms for use in the near term test efforts. The aim is to
reduce, by ground testing, all risk and uncertainty, prior to commitment to
flight demonstrations. This therefore enables early confirmation/validation
of dynamic models and allows computer simulation of mission cases to
verify intended control techniques and probable vehicle interactions using
these models.
Two NASA/MSFC facilities are required to support the TPDM development
process:
• The Flight Robotic Laboratory
• The 6-DOF Contacts Dynamics Facility
Flight Robotic Laboratory
As a precursor to mission simulations within this laboratory, it is envisioned
that the assembled TPDM will be placed on a stand which has 6 DOF
positioning capability, and linear rate control in one direction (the principle
X axis vector). It would be used to establish confirmation that the latch
actuation scheme functions as designed, both in nominal engagement
configuration and "worst case" skewed position. This test examines latch
movements during target vehicle engagement to attain the initial capture
position.
The following represent relevant mission scenario test work that has been
performed (list not complete):
• OMV mission operations using mockup TPDM (teleoperated)
(References 1, 2 of Appendix A)
• Grumman simulation of OMV attached TPDM mockup
(teleoperated)
• Rendezvous technology - Grumman
• Rendezvous technology - MSFC
Mission operations with diminished man-in-the-loop participation have not
been performed (simulated) to any operational extent. Some expert system
logic is desirable to support near-autonomous TPDM operations. The issue
of the docking sensor system commanding the propulsion vehicle
navigation and guidance system direction and range to attain docking needs
to be demonstrated along with the integration of the additional inputs from
the latch control and status signals in the overall operations logic.
The formulation and selection of status monitoring signals required by
local/ground control stations for "limited" abort authority must be
established; transmission frequency must be established to support the
desired basis for operations. The in-situ system should have the necessary
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6.3.2
decisionlogic to implementall plannedoff-nominalcases.Thedesired
controlauthorityof theremoteoperatormustbeexaminedin light of test
experiences.Caninformationbe transmitted,in atimely fashion,which
enablestheoperatorto takepositiveaction- orshouldtheentiredecision
makingauthoritybedelegatedto anexpertsystem?
Thesimulationwork to beperformedin the laboratoryhasacontrolsand
sensorintegrationfocus. It representsanopportunityto verify the
usefulnessto anoperatorof transmitted'remote'testdatato thesimulated
groundstationandto testout thelogicof theautomated ockingsystemand
healthmonitoring/abortcriteria. It isanopportunityto demonstratethe
ARAD systemfunctioningonanintegratedbasiswith thechasevehicle
controlsystem.
Another issue that must be addressed is potential plume disturbance effects.
This effect is strongly dependent on the configuration of the target satellite,
especially the frontal area extending beyond the main body of the satellite.
The chase vehicle thruster firings in the direction of the target satellite are
required to slow the chase vehicle down, but at the same time the propulsion
system plume "pushes" on the surfaces of the target satellite, causing spin,
tumble or other undetermined motion. As suggested earlier, plume
deflectors will diminish the effect, but will increase fuel requirements due to
the restricted angular thrust vector component. Chase vehicle thruster
effects can be included in the simulation by plume force computer modeling.
MSFC 6-DOF Motion Simulator Facility
Previous relevant TPDM development test work, as documented in some of
the references to this report, is as follows:
* OMV Contact Dynamics Test - Overview and Status Update,
March 30,1990, TRW presentation
• 6 - DOF TPDM Contact Dynamics Testing, September 1990,
NAS8-36800, TRW document
• Three Point Docking Mechanism Contact Dynamics Test,
November 7, 1990, TRW presentation
• Equipment Specification Three Point Docking Mechanism (TPDM),
EQ2-830 Rev A dated April 23 1989, TRW document
• Contact Dynamics Simulations, Report #2, document OMV.89.300-103
dated April 11, 1989, TRW document
The focus continues to be the area of two body dynamics and what happens
when two bodies of specific (large) masses contact. In the best case we
would want them to remain together, the contact energy being acceptably
absorbed in the adjoining structure. This however is not the case and
"bounce back" conditions can occur, placing the intended latching function
in jeopardy. The flexibility parameters of the two bodies, specifically the
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adjoiningstructuresmustbeknownsothatacceptableapproach/contact
velocitiescanbeestablished.If testingandassociatedynamicsmodeling
determinethatstiffnessremainsaproblem,specialpreloadeddampers
interfacingtheTPDM to thechasevehiclemaybeanacceptableresolutionto
the issue.Thesemaybepreseto accommodatespecificvehiclemissions;
this approachmitigatesriskandfavorsamoreflexibledesignbasis.
To summarize,thedetailcontactissuesthatareto beaddressedin this
facility testing include:
• first contact,
• bounce effects,
• latch arm loads from bounce effects,
• plume effects,
• differential mass effects between vehicles,
• target vehicle centering design verification testing, and the
• effect of structural flexibility of/between target vehicle and chase vehicle.
6.4 Suggested TPDM Development Program Logic
Figure 6-3 presents a suggested development path logic for the TPDM
showing use of the various facilities.
The Design & Analysis effort, presently underway, is identifying the
TPDM critical design parameters to be used as a basis for development tests
and generation of relevant results. Requirements compilations and
performance specification for all supporting and interfacing systems should
be completed in this phase. The requirement for a flight demonstration to
resolve some of the issues mandates conducting a thorough review to
establish the envelope mission case(s). This ensures that ground
demonstrations investigate these sufficiently to maximize the benefit of the
flight element.
It is suggested that computer modeling of the dynamics problem be started
at this time frame to drive out the design specific flexibility issues and set up
projected test correlation parameters for the tests. The simulation software
will also support development of test plan scenarios and establish
confidence in formulation of planned procedures. The leap frog approach
between test and design computer simulation should continue to
productively evolve the final design.
The fabrication of test hardware, evolving out of design analysis, should
accommodate as many of the flight dynamic hardware qualities as possible
since these are the factors we are looking to simulate in the ground test
program and subsequent flight demonstration. The first test to be
performed is a form-fit test that examines the correlation of the geometry
and latch movement initiation algorithm. Test objectives are to include areas
such information on tolerances and the possibility of off-nominal capture
binding conditions; the computer dynamics software can be modeled to
accommodate some of the former goals.
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The functional testing in the Flight Robotics laboratory represents the first
opportunity to test the integrated propulsion control-ARAD sensor-
docking/abort systems with limited (as planned) operator supervision.
Testing would includes a full mission simulation from at least the point of
attempted initial target recognition by the ARAD sensor to attaining initial
capture position. Breakaway targets may be used in the test to mitigate the
possibility of damage to the facility 6-DOF arm if off-nominal contact loads
occur. "Lessons learned" will be included in the design implementation.
The contact dynamics testing will address the areas starting from just before
latch movement to rigidization. "Lessons learned" should be incorporated
in the design implementation.
Based on successful completion of the ground test development program
and the careful incorporation of "lessons learned" upgrades in the test
hardware, we should have a lower risk basis for proceeding with a flight
experiment to resolve the remaining issues. Data should be available from
the ground program to provide a detail projection of flight demonstration
test results.
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Appendix A
Documents Transmitted for Use and Review
1. OMV Contact Dynamics Test - Overview and Status Update,
March 30,1990, TRW presentation
2. Multi-mission Modular Spacecraft Flight Support System User's Guide
(through change notice 2), 408-2112-0004, March 1980, NASA/GSFC
document
3. Preliminary Design Review for the Three Point Docking Mechanism
Latch Assembly (TPDML), dated May 22-24, 1990, Spar Aerospace
Limited document
4. 6 - DOF TPDM Contact Dynamics Testing, September 1990,
NAS8-36800, TRW document
5. Three Point Docking Mechanism Contact Dynamics Test,
November 7, 1990, TRW presentation
6. Equipment Specification Three Point Docking Mechanism (TPDM),
EQ2-830 Rev A dated April 23 1989, TRW document
7. Contact Dynamics Simulations, Report #2, document OMV.89.300-103
dated April 11, 1989, TRW document
8. User's Guide for the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle, October, 1987,
NASA/MSFC document
9. User's Guide for the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle, March, 1989,
NASA/MSFC document
10. User's Guide for the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle, July, 1989,
NASA/MSFC document
11. OMV/Payloads Interface Requirements Document I Space Telescope,
OMV/ST IRD, January 9, 1985, GSFC document
12. Book, Michael L., Bryan Thomas C., et. al. "Autoguidance Video
Sensor for Docking", (technical paper)
13. Use of Explorer Platform to Demonstrate Automatic Closure and
Docking, dated October 11, 1991, Fairchild presentation
14. TPDM Survey Sheets; requested via memorandum dated June 3, 1991,
Thomas C. Bryan to Distribution
A-1
15. Equipment Specification Mechanism Control Electronics (MSE),
EQ4-4100 Rev A dated April 24 1989, TRW document
16. Design Criteria for Controlling Stress Corrosion Cracking,
MSFC-Spec-522B, July 1, 1987,
17. Protective Finishes for Space Structures and Associated Flight
Equipment General Specification for, MSFC-SPEC-250A,
October 1, 1977
18. General Specification Vacuum Stability Requirements of polymeric
Material for Spacecraft Application, JSC specification SP-R-0022A,
September 9, 1974
19. Flammability, Odor, Offgassing, and Compatibility Requirements and
Test Procedures for materials in Environments That Support Combustion,
NHI¢ 8060.1C, April, 1991
20. Man System Requirements for Weightless Environments,
MSFC-STD-512A, December 1, 1976
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